Uncertain Belief: Is It Rational to Be a Christian?

Oxford University Press UK (1996)
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Abstract

The certainties which once underpinned Christian belief have crumbled in a world where science sets the standard for what is true. A rational case for belief must therefore be constructed out of uncertainties. Probability theory provides the tools for measuring and combining uncertainties and is thus the key to progress. This book examines four much debated topics where the logic of uncertain inference can be brought to bear. These are: miracles, the paranormal, God's existence, and the Bible. Given the great diversity of evidence, it is not surprising that opposite conclusions have been drawn by supposedly rational people. An assessment of the state of argument from a probabilistic perspective is overdue. In this book Professor Bartholomew examines and refutes some of the more extravagent claims, evaluates the weight of some of the quantitive evidence, and provides an answer to the fundamental question: is it rational to be a Christian?

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