Temporal passage and Kant's second analogy

Ratio 15 (2):134–153 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this essay I address the question of the reality of temporal passage through a discussion of some of the implications of Kant's reasoning concerning the necessary conditions of objective judgement. Some theorists have claimed that the attribution of non‐relational temporal properties to objects and events represents a conceptual confusion, or ‘category mistake’. By means of an examination of Kant's Second Analogy, and a comparison between that argument and Cassam's recent exploration of an argument regarding the necessity of the conceptualisation of ourselves as spatially located, I draw out a consequence of Kant's argument: namely, that the representation of temporal becoming is a necessary condition of objective judgement and an a priori element in the representation of objects of experience. I finish by explaining why this would show that the attribution of temporal becoming to objects and events cannot be described as a category mistake

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,310

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
97 (#125,450)

6 months
3 (#209,676)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Adrian Bardon
Wake Forest University

Citations of this work

Kant on the Spontaneous Power of the Mind.John J. Callanan - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (3):565-588.
Empiricism, Time-Awareness, and Hume's Manners of Disposition.Adrian Bardon - 2007 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (1):47-63.
Kant-Bibliographie 2002.Margit Ruffing - 2004 - Kant Studien 95 (4):505-538.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references