The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games

Theory and Decision 67 (2):223-237 (2009)
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Signaling games with reinforcement learning have been used to model the evolution of term languages (Lewis 1969, Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Skyrms 2006, “Signals” Presidential Address. Philosophy of Science Association for PSA). In this article, syntactic games, extensions of David Lewis’s original sender–receiver game, are used to illustrate how a language that exploits available syntactic structure might evolve to code for states of the world. The evolution of a language occurs in the context of available vocabulary and syntax—the role played by each component is compared in the context of simple reinforcement learning



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Jeffrey Barrett
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

The Evolution of Vagueness.Cailin O'Connor - 2013 - Erkenntnis (S4):1-21.
The Flow of Information in Signaling Games.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):155 - 165.
Vagueness and Imprecise Imitation in Signalling Games.Michael Franke & José Pedro Correia - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1037-1067.

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References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):229-236.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (282):604-606.

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