The Conceptual Act Theory: A Précis

Emotion Review 6 (4):292-297 (2014)
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Abstract

According to the conceptual act theory, emotions emerge when physical sensations in the self and physical actions in others are meaningfully linked to situations during a process that can be called both cognitive and perceptual (creating emotional experiences, and emotion perceptions, respectively). There are key four hypotheses: (a) an emotion (like anger) is a conceptual category, populated with instances that are tailored to the environment; (b) each instance of emotion is constructed within the brain’s functional architecture of domain-general core systems; (c) the workings of each system must be holistically understood within the momentary state of the brain, the body, and the surrounding context; (d) being emergent states, emotional episodes have functional features that physical states, alone, do not have. Similarities and differences to other theoretical approaches to emotion are discussed.

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