Abstract

In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant says that human cognition is possible only through the unification of intuition and concept – what has been called “the togetherness principle”. Taking intuition and concept as complementary one to each other, some tend to see Kant as committed to the thesis that cognition, as objective representation with consciousness, would require more than the affection of the knowing subject. This paper tries to sketch possible ways to relate the togetherness principle to the enactivism of Alva Noë in Action in Perception. The enactivism is an approach from cognitive science and, as proposed by Noë, it suggests that perception is not something that happens to one or with one, but something that one does. According to Noë, perception requires bodily skills and a practical understanding concerning the way these skills coordinate with sensory stimulation: one must be able to know how to use these skills in order to perceive real properties. Since cognition involves intentionality, it also requires an active capacity by which the object will be represented with the generality of concepts, therefore suggesting a closer relation between Kant’s togetherness principle and Noë’s enactivism.