Abstract

What is the status of the thesis that sense determines reference in frege's philosophy of language? frege's endorsement of the thesis is notorious, and it has been heavily criticized in recent years. however, it seems to me that both with regard to its exact interpretation and to the role it plays in frege's philosophy of language the thesis is still in need of further clarification. the main claim of the present article is that a certain "realistic" interpretation of the above thesis is implied by frege's main argument for the distinction between sense and reference, and that under this interpretation the thesis meets most of the objections raised against it. the central point of this interpretation is that the sense of a term incorporates conditions that provide ways for picking out an "independently identifiable" object (a "given" object) as the referent of the term. this interpretation is "realistic" in character in that it implies that the conditions incorporated in the sense of a term are not necessarily true of its referent