Abstract
I argue that there is nothing about the structure of inference to the best explanation (IBE)
that prevents it from establishing a contradiction in general, though there are some potential
limitations on when it can be used for this purpose. Studying the relationship between IBE and
contradictions is worthwhile for three reasons. First, it enhances our understanding of IBE.
We see that, in many cases, IBE does not require explanations to be consistent, though there
are some cases where consistency may be required. Second, the argument has implications
for the debate over scientific realism. Many scientific theories appear to be inconsistent.
The best argument for scientific realism, however, appeals to IBE. My argument thus shows
that a certain kind of realist faces a threat from inconsistent theories. Third, the argument is
important for dialetheism. Dialetheists maintain that some contradictions are true. Many of
the arguments in favour of dialetheism appeal to explanatory considerations. What I say here
provides support for defending dialethism using an IBE-based methodology.