Abstract
The representation of propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.) and the analysis
of natural-language, propositional-attitude reports presents difficult problems
for cognitive science and artificial intelligence. In particular, various representational
approaches to attitudes involve the incorrect “imputation,” to cognitive
agents, of the use of artificial theory-laden notions. Interesting cases of this problem
are shown to occur in several approaches to attitudes. The imputation problem
is shown to arise from the way that representational approaches explicate
properties and relationships, and in particular from the way they explicate propositional
attitudes themselves. Another factor contributing to imputation is the
compositional nature of typical semantic approaches to propositional-attitude
reports. Some strategies for avoiding undesirable imputation are examined. One
of the main conclusions is that the importance of imputations that arise in a representation
scheme depends strongly on the use to which the scheme is put -- on
whether, for instance, the scheme is used as part of a formal, objective account
of natural language, or is used rather as a representational tool within an agent.