Abstract
Raising an ontological question regarding the meaning of 'a being' and also the meaning of an 'intelligent being', Heidegger identifies intentionality with the skilful coping of a social, norm bound, engaged and context dependent embodied being. This he describes in terms of a Dasein, a being-in-the-world, and its tool using activity with respect to social practices and norms. Unlike Husserl's, intentionality in Heidegger is primarily semantic: the necessary conditions of skilful coping are also the necessary conditions of intentional acts. The entire question of computers attaining Dasein-like character is largely dependent on whether these purposeful causal laws can also be formalized. While Dreyfus rules out this possibility, Mark Okrent successfully argues that there is nothing in Heidegger that rules out the possibility of computers attaining a Dasein-like character. While in full agreement with Mark Okrent, I have made an attempt at understanding the entire debate with more emphasis on the implications of a Dasein attaining a computer-like character.