Fictional mechanism explanations: clarifying explanatory holes in engineering science

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2):1-19 (2022)
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Abstract

This paper discusses a class of mechanistic explanations employed in engineering science where the activities and organization of nonstandard entities are cited as core factors responsible for failures. Given the use of mechanistic language by engineers and the manifestly mechanistic structure of these explanations, I consider several interpretations of these explanations within the new mechanical framework. I argue that these interpretations fail to solve several philosophical problems and propose an account of fictional mechanism explanations instead. According to this account, fictional mechanism explanations provide descriptions of fictional mechanisms that enable the tracking of counterfactual dependencies of the physical system they model by capturing system constraints. Engineers use these models to learn about and understand properties of materials, to build computational simulations of their behaviour, and to design new materials.

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References found in this work

Explaining the brain: mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
The New Mechanical Philosophy.Stuart Glennan - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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