Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (4):337-355 (2009)

Authors
Elizabeth Barnes
University of Virginia
Abstract
abstract In this paper I develop a characterization of disability according to which disability is in no way a sub-optimal feature. I argue, however, that this conception of disability is compatible with the idea that having a disability is, at least in a restricted sense, a harm. I then go on to argue that construing disability in this way avoids many of the common objections levelled at accounts which claim that disability is not a negative feature.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2009.00443.x
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Disability Studies, Conceptual Engineering, and Conceptual Activism.Elizabeth Amber Cantalamessa - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (1-2):46-75.
Disability and Adaptive Preference.Elizabeth Barnes - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):1-22.

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