Belief, Control, and Conclusive Reasons

Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):315-325 (2010)
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00384283

DOI

10.1111/j.2041-6962.2002.tb01904.x

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Gordon Barnes
State University of New York (SUNY)

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