The Dynamics of Epistemic Attitudes in Resource-Bounded Agents

Studia Logica 107 (3):457-488 (2019)
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Abstract

The paper presents a new logic for reasoning about the formation of beliefs through perception or through inference in non-omniscient resource-bounded agents. The logic distinguishes the concept of explicit belief from the concept of background knowledge. This distinction is reflected in its formal semantics and axiomatics: we use a non-standard semantics putting together a neighborhood semantics for explicit beliefs and relational semantics for background knowledge, and we have specific axioms in the logic highlighting the relationship between the two concepts. Mental operations of perceptive type and inferential type, having effects on epistemic states of agents, are primitives in the object language of the logic. At the semantic level, they are modelled as special kinds of model-update operations, in the style of dynamic epistemic logic. Results about axiomatization, decidability and complexity for the logic are given in the paper.

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Citations of this work

Dynamic Hyperintensional Belief Revision.Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic (3):766-811.
The Logic of Framing Effects.Francesco Berto & Aybüke Özgün - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (3):939-962.

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References found in this work

Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning.Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern - 1987 - Artificial Intelligence 34 (1):39-76.
Impossible possible worlds vindicated.Jaakko Hintikka - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (4):475 - 484.

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