Opacity and the double life of singular propositions

Journal of Applied Logic 10 (3):250-259 (2012)

Abstract

In this paper I analyze David Kaplan’s essay “Opacity”. In “Opacity” Kaplan attempts to dismiss Quine’s concerns about quantification across intensional (modal and intentional) operators. I argue that Kaplan succeeds in showing that quantification across intensional operators is logically coherent and that quantified modal logic is strictly speaking not committed to essentialism. However, I also argue that this is not in and of itself sufficient to support Kaplan’s more ambitious attempt to move beyond purely logical results and provide unified, uncontroversial interpretations of both “believes” and “necessarily”. In the paper I raise several questions about the subject matter of logic and the role of semantics, with special focus on singular propositions.

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Author's Profile

Roberta Ballarin
University of British Columbia

References found in this work

Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
Quantifying In.David Kaplan - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.
A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic.Saul A. Kripke - 1959 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (1):1-14.
Three Grades of Modal Involvment.W. V. O. Quine - 1953 - Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy 14:65-81.

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Citations of this work

Kaplan’s Counterexample to Quine’s Theorem.Paolo Bonardi - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):196-223.

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