Religious Studies 42 (4):417-430 (2006)

Kevin Corcoran offers an account of how one can be a physicalist about human persons, deny temporal gaps in the existence of persons, and hold that there is an afterlife. I argue that Corcoran's account both violates the necessity of metaphysical identity and implausibly makes an individual's existence dependent on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. Corcoran's defence is considered, as well as Stephen Davis's suggestions on how an account like Corcoran's can defend itself against these concerns. It is shown, however, that the difficulties remain in full force and, therefore, that Corcoran's account fails to reconcile physicalism, no gappy existence, and an afterlife.
Keywords personal identity  afterlife
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DOI 10.1017/S0034412506008584
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References found in this work BETA

Physicalism and Resurrection.Stephen T. Davis - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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The Revision Theory of Resurrection.Eric Steinhart - 2008 - Religious Studies 44 (1):63-81.

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