Mind 117 (468):763-782 (2008)
AbstractThis paper challenges the assumption that reasons are intrinsic to rational action. A great many actions are not best understood as ones in which the agent acted for reasons--and yet they can be understood as rational, and as open to rational criticism. The relative paucity of explicit reason-giving, practical arguments in daily life presents a general philosophical problem. It reflects the existence of a class of ways in which reason can regulate action, which goes far beyond producing reasons or applying principles. Much practical reasoning takes the form of what H. P. Grice called 'thought-transitions'. These are neither in the form of standard practical arguments, nor can they be so reconstructed without distorting the ways in which an agent thinks. Some actions to which one is led by a thought transition are rational, namely when what Grice called a 'propension' towards a given class of actions--a standing inclination to act in certain ways--would itself stand up to rational evaluation. The paper examines two bases for such endorsement, one local and limited, and one much more speculative, due to Grice himself
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Shared Agency Without Shared Intention.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):665-688.
The Metaphysics of Rule-Following.Markus E. Schlosser - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):345-369.
Un primate de tercera Y Una persona de segunda.: Sobre el valor Del rostro, la mirada Y la piel para comprender a un extraño.Miguel Ángel Pérez Jiménez - 2011 - Universitas Philosophica 28 (57):265-293.
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