Abstract

In this book Richard Foley formulates the problem of the authority of others’ testimony, and of the rationality of one’s own beliefs, in terms of trust. Part 1 discusses the appropriateness of trust in one’s own cognitive faculties and beliefs, while part 2 argues that those assessments provide a basis for trust in others’ beliefs as well as those of one’s earlier and later selves. He does not offer us an analysis of trust or what it is to speak of trust as rational or reasonable. He simply uses the notion to discuss what is surely one form of the problem of the rationality of belief. Rationality, in this book as in his earlier works, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality and Working Without a Net, is understood from a strict internalist and first-person perspective. Assessments of the rationality of opinions, like assessments of decisions, are claims, from a particular perspective, about how effectively the belief or decision promotes a goal or set of goals. With respect to belief and rational belief, the goal is what Foley calls the traditional “epistemic goal” of accurate and comprehensive beliefs. On his view, the perspective from which the assessment is made is the individual’s, taken on reflection. From the start, Foley’s understanding of rationality involves the first-person perspective. Rational belief is belief that will stand up to an individual’s own self-criticism.