Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind

New York: Cambridge University Press (1995)
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Abstract

Explaining Attitudes offers an important challenge to the dominant conception of belief found in the work of such philosophers as Dretske and Fodor. According to this dominant view beliefs, if they exist at all, are constituted by states of the brain. Lynne Rudder Baker rejects this view and replaces it with a quite different approach - practical realism. Seen from the perspective of practical realism, any argument that interprets beliefs as either brain states or states of immaterial souls is a 'non-starter'. Practical realism takes beliefs to be states of the whole persons, rather like states of health. What a person believes is determined by what a person would do, say and think in various circumstances. Thus beliefs and other attitudes are interwoven into an integrated, commonsensical conception of reality.

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Attitudes as nonentities.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203.
Are beliefs brain states?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2001 - In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. CSLI Publications (Stanford).
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Science and the Attitudes: A Reply to Sanford.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1996 - Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):187-189.

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Author's Profile

Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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