The Intentionality of Intentions

Review of Metaphysics 30 (3):389 - 414 (1977)
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Abstract

Berkeley says that "the making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active." What did Berkeley take as the paradigm of that making which denominates mind active? He speaks in the same passage of exciting "ideas in my mind at pleasure," of varying and shifting the scene "as oft as I see fit. It is no more than willing and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy." This quite clearly takes human idea-making to be fantasizing. But if this is the only sort of making we are capable of, it is a poor model for that divine making which Berkeley wishes to obtain by "reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections." Ideas of the fancy are not strong, lively, vivid, nor real for other minds. Has Berkeley any other, better, human model for the divine making? In his Commonplace Book, Berkeley notes tersely, "We move our legs ourselves." This suggests that our voluntary actions could be taken by Berkeley as ideas made by us. This would at least give him a human model for that divine responsibility for something real, something strong, vivid, lively, something which other minds have no choice but to see, when in broad daylight they open their eyes from the appropriate vantage point.

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Annette Claire Baier
Last affiliation: University of Otago

Citations of this work

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