Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 13 (2):81-95 (2013)

The main purpose of this article is to use Ayn Rand’s analysis of the meaning of objectivity to clarify the much-discussed question of whether probability is “objective” or “subjective.” This results in a classification of probability theories as frequentist, subjective Bayesian, or objective Bayesian. The work of objective Bayesian E. T. Jaynes is emphasized, and is used to provide a formal definition of probability. The relation between probability and induction is covered briefly, with probability theory presented as the basis of inductive inference.
Keywords probability  objective  subjective  Bayesian  Ayn Rand  Jaynes
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DOI 10.5325/jaynrandstud.13.2.0081
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References found in this work BETA

The Mismeasure of Man.Stephen Jay Gould - 1983 - Ethics 94 (1):153-155.
Probability, Frequency, and Reasonable Expectation.Richard T. Cox - 1946 - American Journal of Physics 14 (2):1-13.
Probability Disassembled.John D. Norton - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):141-171.

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The Objective-Subjective Dichotomy and Rand's Trichotomy.Arnold Baise - 2017 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 17 (2):227-237.

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