Kinds of Life. On the Phenomenological Basis of the Distinction Between Higher and Lower Animals.

Journal of Environmental Philosophy 8 (2):47-68 (2011)
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Abstract

Drawing upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological constitution of the Other through Einfülhung, I argue that the hierarchical distinction between higher and lower animals – which has been dismissed by Heidegger for being anthropocentric – must not be conceived as an objective distinction between “primitive” animals and “more evolved” ones, but rather corresponds to a phenomenological distinction between familiar and unfamiliar animals.

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