Intentionalism and pain

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Pain may appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory. After categorizing versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an 'objectivist' and 'non-mentalist' version is the most promising, if it can withstand two objections concerning what we say when in pain, and the distinctiveness of pain. I rebut these objections, in a way available to both opponents of and adherents to the view that experiential content is entirely conceptual.

Similar books and articles

Pain, dislike and experience.Guy Kahane - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):327-336.
The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
Imperative content and the painfulness of pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism.Ned Block - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. pp. 137-142.
Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1007-1030.
Pain and Bodily Care: Whose Body Matters?Frederique de Vignemont - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):542-560.
Intentionalism and change blindness.Greg Janzen - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.
The Imperative View of Pain.David Bain - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.
Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
1,572 (#5,975)

6 months
277 (#6,834)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Pain.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 474-93.
Affect: Representationalists' Headache.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.

View all 40 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references