Comparing uncertainty aversion towards different sources

Theory and Decision 83 (1):1-18 (2017)
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Abstract

We propose simple behavioral definitions of comparative uncertainty aversion for a single agent towards different sources of uncertainty. Our definitions allow for the comparison of utility curvature for different sources if the agent’s choices satisfy subjective expected utility towards each source. We discuss how our definitions can be applied to investigate ambiguity aversion in Klibanoff et al.’s :1849–1892, 2005) smooth ambiguity model, to study the effects of learning and situational factors on uncertainty preferences, and to compare uncertainty preferences between different agents.

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References found in this work

Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
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Judged Knowledge and Ambiguity Aversion.Hans-jÜrgen Keppe - 1995 - Theory and Decision 39 (1):51-77.

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