Moral Objectivity: A Kantian Illusion?
Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2):31-45 (2015)
Abstract
Some moral claims strike us as objective. It is often argued that this shows morality to be objective. Moral experience – broadly construed – is invoked as the strongest argument for moral realism, the thesis that there are moral facts or properties.See e.g. Jonathan Dancy, “Two conceptions of Moral Realism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60 : 167–187. Realists, however, cannot appropriate the argument from moral experience. In fact, constructivists argue that to validate the ways we experience the objectivity of moral claims, realism must be rejected.Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity . There is a general agreement that ethical theory bears the burden of proof of explaining the objective-seeming features of our moral experience.While disputing objectivity, antirealists commit themselves to account for the objectivist pretensions of moral claims. Anti-realists agree with the traditional view that moral experie ..Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s10790-014-9448-7
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Citations of this work
Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: from Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance.Jeroen Hopster - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):763-780.
Neo‐Humean rationality and two types of principles.Caj Strandberg - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
References found in this work
Constructivism about Practical Knowledge.Carla Bagnoli - 2013 - In Constructivism in Ethics. Cambridge University Press. pp. 153-182.
Ethics and the Fabric of the World.Bernard Williams - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.