Feeling Wronged: The Value and Deontic Power of Moral Distress

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):89-106 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper argues that moral distress is a distinctive category of reactive attitudes that are taken to be part and parcel of the social dynamics for recognition. While moral distress does not demonstrate evidence of wrongdoing, it does emotionally articulate a demand for normative attention that is addressed to others as moral providers. The argument for this characterization of the deontic power of moral distress builds upon two examples in which the cognitive value of the victim’s emotional experience is controversial: the case of micro-aggression, and the case of misplaced distress. In contrast to appraisal and perceptual models of distress, it is argued that its epistemic and normative value is dialogical rather than evidential, in that it presses claims that engage the audience in a normative discussion about the normative standing of the claimant, the proper grounds of the attitude, and the normative standards used to assess them.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 78,037

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Not und die Grenzen der Moral.Simon Derpmann - 2014 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 62 (6):1138-1152.
Moral distress.Caroline Ong - 2015 - Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin 20 (4):12.
Moral Distress in Nursing and Its Causes.Selin Keskin Kızıtepe & Zeliha Koç - 2019 - Türkiye Biyoetik Dergisi 6 (1):5-12.
Moral Distress in Healthcare.Judith Andre - 2002 - Bioethics Forum 18 (1-2):44-46.


Added to PP

24 (#490,091)

6 months
9 (#108,962)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Carla Bagnoli
University of Modena

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Ideal vs. Non‐ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map.Laura Valentini - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):654-664.

View all 27 references / Add more references