The Completeness of Mechanistic Explanations

Philosophy of Science 82 (5):775-786 (2015)
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Abstract

The paper discusses methodological guidelines for evaluating mechanistic explanations. According to current accounts, a satisfactory mechanistic explanation should include all of the relevant features of the mechanism, its component entities and activities, and their properties and organization, as well as exhibit productive continuity. It is not specified, however, how this kind of mechanistic completeness can be demonstrated. I argue that parameter sufficiency inferences based on mathematical model simulations provide a way of determining whether a mechanism capable of producing the phenomenon of interest can be constructed from mechanistic components organized, acting, and having the properties described in the mechanistic explanation

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Baetu Tudor
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières

References found in this work

Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
When mechanistic models explain.Carl F. Craver - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):355-376.
Role functions, mechanisms, and hierarchy.Carl F. Craver - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (1):53-74.
What is a mechanism? A counterfactual account.Jim Woodward - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S366-S377.

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