Evidentialism, vice, and virtue

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):545-567 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Evidentialists maintain that epistemic justification is strictly a function of the evidence one has at the moment of belief. I argue here, on the basis of two kinds of cases, that the possession of good evidence is an insuflicient basis for justification. I go on to propose a modification of evidentialism according to which justification sometimes requires intellectually virtuous agency. The discussion thereby underscores an important point of contact between evidentialism and the more recent enterprise of virtue epistemology

Other Versions

reprint Baehr, Jason (2011) "Evidentialism, vice, and virtue". In Dougherty, Trent, Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. : Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,854

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Gettier For Justification.Frank Hofmann - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):305-318.
A Meno Problem for Evidentialism.Daniel M. Mittag - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):250-266.
Prospects for evidentialism.Bob Beddor - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.
Responsibilist Evidentialism.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2999-3016.
Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
Values, circumstances, and epistemic justification.Rosalind S. Simson - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):373-391.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-04-28

Downloads
255 (#105,164)

6 months
11 (#364,844)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jason Baehr
Loyola Marymount University

Citations of this work

Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering.Carolina Flores & Elise Woodard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2547-2571.
Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence).Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):368-393.
Evidence and Bias.Nick Hughes - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.
Evidentialism.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.

View all 20 references / Add more references