The Causal Mechanism Theory of Legal Causation

Ratio Juris 34 (1):57-73 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Theories of legal causation that identify the concept with probability‐raising generate false positives where the defendant's conduct raises the probability of harm but brings about that harm in the wrong kind of way. Moreover, what the law seeks to deter is not conduct that raises the probability of harm, but rather conduct that is dangerous. A legal or proximate cause is one that harms the plaintiff through the causal mechanism that sustains the lawful generalization that the defendant's conduct was dangerous.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Fact and Law in the Causal Inquiry.Alex Broadbent - 2009 - Legal Theory 15 (3):173-191.
Mechanisms.Stuart Glennan - 2009 - In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press.
The supposed competition between theories of human causal inference.David Danks - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):259 – 272.
A Model-Invariant Theory of Causation.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):45-96.
Mechanisms and downward causation.Max Kistler - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):595-609.
Can the Agency Theory Be Salvaged?Andrei A. Buckareff - 2001 - Philosophia Christi 3 (1):217-224.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-05-17

Downloads
14 (#846,545)

6 months
2 (#668,348)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.
Consequentialism and Cluelessness.James Lenman - 2000 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (4):342-370.
Are dispositions reducible?George Molnar - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):1-17.

View all 11 references / Add more references