Scetticismo humeano e filosofia morale

Etica E Politica 1 (1) (1999)
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Abstract

James Allan’s book A Sceptical Theory of Morality and Law is an interesting and first–rate attempt of using a humean theory as a model for a contemporary sceptical view in ethics and philosophy of law. In presenting Hume’s theory, Allan explicitly declares that he is not interested in an exegeses of Hume’s theory, but he intends to use it as a critical tool for contemporary moral discussions. Allan’s books surely represents a major contribution to contemporary moral discussions, and some of his topics deserves a further discussion, as his discussion of Thomas Nagel, his criticism to moral intuitionism, the fact of whether his naturalistic reduction leads to scepticism or to naturalistic realism

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Elvio Baccarini
University of Trieste

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