Abstract
In this paper, I analyse and compare Anton Marty’s and Alexius Meinong’s theories of
judgement. There are at least two reasons speaking in favour of such a comparison.
First, both philosophers were influenced by Franz Brentano’s approach to
consciousness, in general, and by his theory of judgement, in particular: in differing
degrees, Marty and Meinong may be considered pupils of Brentano. Second, the two
philosophers introduced similar amendments to Brentano’s approach. According to
Brentanian orthodoxy, we do not have access to any entity that objectively grounds the truth of our judgements, whilst Marty and Meinong both commit themselves to the view that we do. This paper reconstructs the specific ontological characteristics of these entities and the kind of epistemological access we have to them. Finally, a crucial but problematic component of Marty’s and Meinong’s theories is addressed, i.e., the
introduction of negative entities to ground the truth of negative judgements