Giorgione was so-called because of his name

Philosophical Perspectives 16:73-103 (2002)
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Abstract

Proper names seem simple on the surface. Indeed, anyone unfamiliar with philosophical debates about them might wonder what the fuss could possibly be about. It seems obvious why we need them and what we do with them, and that is to talk about particular persons, places, and things. You don't have to be as smart as Mill to think that proper names are simply tags attached to individuals. But sometimes appearances are deceiving.

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Kent Bach
San Francisco State University

Citations of this work

Names Are Predicates.Delia Graff Fara - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):59-117.
Type-Ambiguous Names.Anders J. Schoubye - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):715-767.
Variabilism.Samuel Cumming - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):525-554.
On the linguistic complexity of proper names.Ora Matushansky - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):573-627.

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Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.

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