Inconsistency in natural languages

Synthese 190 (15):3175-3184 (2013)
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Abstract

An argument for Trivialism, the view that natural languages are logically inconsistent, is provided that does not rely on contentious empirical assumptions about natural language terms such as “and” or “or.” Further, the view is defended against an important objection recently mounted against it by Thomas Hofweber

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Jody Azzouni
Tufts University

Citations of this work

A Normative Argument Against Explosion.Mark Pinder - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):61-70.
Observations on the Trivial World.Zach Weber & Hitoshi Omori - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):975-994.
Trivial Languages.Arvid Båve - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):1-17.

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References found in this work

In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The inconsistency of certain formal logic.Haskell B. Curry - 1942 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):115-117.
Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth.Jody Azzouni - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.

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