Is introspection inferential?

In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate (2003)
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Abstract

I introduce the Displaced Perception Model of Introspection developed by Dretske which treats introspection of phenomenal states as inferential and criticize it

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Murat Aydede
University of British Columbia

References found in this work

A theory of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.
The Mind's Awareness of Itself.Fred Dretske - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-124.
Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about pain.Murat Aydede - 2001 - Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.
Differences that Make No Difference.Fred Dretske - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):41-57.

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