Abstract

In this dissertation I examine critically the scientific holism of Pierre Duhem, Karl Popper and W. V. Quine. I contend that there is a central thesis, which I have dubbed the "Duhem-Popper-Quine thesis," that is common to the work of these three authors but that in each author's work it is reflected differently. ;Duhem's holism was rather sweeping--he contended that no isolated hypothesis can be refuted by the results of experiment--but also rather restricted, being limited to physical science. I argue that it was too restricted, because it was too closely tied to certain features of modern physical theory. ;Popper's holism was less restricted--it applied to all of empirical science--but more guarded than Duhem's. Popper, however, confined his attention to empirical science as traditionally conceived. He rejected the possibility that laws of logic may be revised in the face of recalcitrant experience. ;Quine was the most radical of the three holists. The most controversial aspect of Quine's holism was his willingness to countenance the revisability of not only hypotheses in empirical science but also what we take to be the laws of logic. ;It is this last aspect of Quine's holism that I find implausible and I argue that the law of noncontradiction is an important counterexample to his claim that "no statement is immune to revision." This, I contend, is the key to the superiority of Popper's holism over Quine's, despite a few weaknesses in Popper's position.