Perceptual variation and access to colors

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-22 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

To identify the set of reflectances that constitute redness, the authors must first determine which surfaces are red. They do this by relying on widespread agreement among us. However, arguments based on the possible ways in which humans would perceive colors show that mere widespread agreement among us is not a satisfactory way to determine which surfaces are red.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
50 (#282,559)

6 months
1 (#1,040,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Edward Averill
Texas Tech University

Citations of this work

A realistic colour realism.Joshua Gert - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):565 – 589.
Reflectance Physicalism About Color: The Story Continues.Zoltan Jakab - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):463-488.
Unknowable Colour Facts.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):909-941.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Ontological relativity and other essays.Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.) - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception.Marc H. Bornstein - 1980 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 39 (2):203-206.

View all 104 references / Add more references