Bayesian Convergence and the Fair-Balance Paradox

Erkenntnis 83 (2):253-263 (2018)
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Abstract

The paper discusses Bayesian convergence when the truth is excluded from the analysis by means of a simple coin-tossing example. In the fair-balance paradox a fair coin is tossed repeatedly. A Bayesian agent, however, holds the a priori view that the coin is either biased towards heads or towards tails. As a result the truth is ignored by the agent. In this scenario the Bayesian approach tends to confirm a false model as the data size goes to infinity. I argue that the fair-balance paradox reveals an unattractive feature of the Bayesian approach to scientific inference and explore a modification of the paradox.

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Bengt Autzen
University College, Cork

Citations of this work

Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.
Deterministic Convergence and Strong Regularity.Michael Nielsen - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1461-1491.

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References found in this work

The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin T. Kelly - 1996 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by Kevin Kelly.
The book of evidence.Peter Achinstein - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.

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