Intergenerational Justice: A Conceptual History and Analysis
Dissertation, University of Minnesota (
1991)
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Abstract
This dissertation examines the historical roots of our concept of intergenerational justice and analyzes this concept critically. I trace the historical roots of our concept of intergenerational justice to the writings of the Bible and Plato, and examine the contribution of Edmund Burke. The traditional understanding that intergenerational justice consists of acting justly in an intergenerational community is contrasted with the dominant contemporary view that intergenerational justice consists of meeting our obligations to future persons. ;My analysis of contemporary approaches suggests that while a concern with meeting our obligations to those persons who will live in the future represents a legitimate and coherent ethical concern, it also represents too narrow an understanding of intergenerational justice. ;My examination of the coherence of the concept of intergenerational justice focuses on the debate between cultural relativists, who suggest that the concept is incoherent and "universalistic" thinkers who defend the concept. I conclude that the acceptance of relativistic principles ought not lead us to conclude that the concept of intergenerational justice is incoherent. ;My analysis of the sufficiency of our understanding of intergenerational justice focuses on three problems: population size , population identity and obligations to past generations. I argue that none of these problems can be addressed adequately by theories which define intergenerational justice as meeting our obligations to future persons. Among the important "intergenerational" questions not addressed adequately by contemporary understandings are whether, and under what circumstances, we have an obligation to ensure the perpetuation of the human species, the moral limits of our power to affect the identity of future persons, and the nature of our obligations to the dead. ;I conclude that a unified and comprehensive theory of justice is needed, but that we are unlikely to develop such a theory without radically transforming our present understandings of justice. In the absence of a unified theory, we are likely to have to settle for recognizing that intergenerational justice has several components, all of which must be addressed separately