The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):355-375 (1998)

Robert N. Audi
University of Notre Dame
This paper clarifies the nature of moral experience, examines its evidential role in supporting moral judgments, and argues that moral experiences can be among the things having intrinsic value. Moral experience is compared with aesthetic experience and contrasted with its close relative, non-moral experience combined with moral beliefs. The concluding sections explore the case for the organicity of intrinsic value and the kind of role such value can play in grounding moral obligation
Keywords emotion  evidence  experience  intrinsic value  moral judgment  obligation  organicity  pluralism  reason for action
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/a:1009799221540
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Hedonic Pluralism.Irwin Goldstein - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):49 - 55.

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Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Is There a Moral Duty to Die?J. Angelo Corlett - 2001 - Health Care Analysis 9 (1):41-63.

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