The article is concerned with the practicalist attempt to "solve" the problem of induction. The point of departure is the concept of counter-induction introduced by Max Black and his refutation of practicalism. If we are not to beg the question whether induction yields knowledge of the future, Max Black asserts, there is a symmetry between induction and counter-induction as methods. The main point of the article is to show that this assertion is false, at least when induction and counter-induction are compared as regards their relations to hypothetico-deductive method. As regards these relations, there is a striking asymmetry. The author tries to establish the following conclusion: A theory can agree with all future data and yet be false because it does not agree with all past data. If we are not to be in a position where our theories are necessarily falsified either by past or future data, we must use induction rather than counter-induction
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201746208601355
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,259
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Mysticism and Logic.Bertrand Russell - 1918 - Dover Publications.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Counter-Induction.John L. Pollock - 1962 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 5 (1-4):284 – 294.
A Material Theory of Induction.John D. Norton - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
Some Problems of Counter-Inductive Policy as Opposed to Inductive. Audun - 1962 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 5 (1-4):267 – 283.
There Are No Universal Rules for Induction.John D. Norton - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777.
Tracking Track Records, I.Peter Lipton - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):179–205.


Added to PP index

Total views
15 ( #700,725 of 2,518,488 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #408,186 of 2,518,488 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes