Authors
Robert N. Audi
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers these and other questions by developing an account of how moral properties, even if not causal, can figure in perception in a way that grounds moral knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00187.x
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following.John McDowell - 1981 - In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge. pp. 141--62.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Significance of High-Level Content.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.
Perceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience.Preston J. Werner - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):294-317.
Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

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