Moral perception and moral knowledge

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):79-97 (2010)
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Abstract

This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers these and other questions by developing an account of how moral properties, even if not causal, can figure in perception in a way that grounds moral knowledge

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2010-05-27

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Robert N. Audi
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

The significance of high-level content.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.
Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience.Preston J. Werner - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):294-317.
Perceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
On the Epistemological Significance of Value Perception.Michael Milona - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 200-218.

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References found in this work

Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Non-cognitivism and rule-following.John McDowell - 1981 - In Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Boston: Routledge. pp. 141--62.
What are the Options?Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - In Ethics without principles. New York: Oxford University Press.

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