Abstract
The appeal to intuitions is a pervasive strategy in contemporary philosophical discourse. A good philosophical theory is widely taken to be one that gives an adequate account of our intuitions. Ethical theory is no exception. But only a few of the many philosophers who appeal to intuitions as prima facie evidence in ethical theorizing would espouse ethical intuitionism. This calls for explanation. One would think that, in virtually any form, intuitionism in ethics is above all an approach that justifies generalizations in ethics by appeal to the very intuitions that many who oppose intuitionism use themselves as a basis for their own ethical views. Why, then, do so many ethical theorists strongly resist combining their appeal to intuitions with some form of intuitionism? I want to explore this question. To answer it we need a clearer conception of ethical intuitionism, an account of its relation to ethical intuitions, and a theory of how both are related to the distinction between rationalism and empiricism in moral epistemology. If this task of explication succeeds, it will provide the raw materials of a framework for moral theory that overcomes many of the difficulties of intuitionism, accounts for the role of intuitions in moral reasoning, and provides the outline of a moral epistemology. This theoretical framework is what I shall call ethical reflectionism.