Abstract
This interesting and original essay deals with the sense in which the self is a problem, i.e. the sense in which the self poses a problem. The central thesis is carefully argued: "that if there is a problem of the self, its solution is that self is a problem." Central to the thesis is the distinction between persons and selves. The concept of a person is in Heideggerian terms "ontic" in the sense that it does not arise from any theoretical concern. The concept of self is an "ontological" one. Chapter one argues for the assumption that "persons can be generally inconsistent" and for the distinction between computers and persons. In Chapter two, "the self" is defined as "the locus of the inconsistency." The remaining essays deal with the problems of identity, immortality, consciousness and the pivotal role of the self in philosophical controversy. The book is clearly written and its thesis is carefully supported by arguments. It is an original contribution to the philosophy of mind.--A. S. C.