A Problem for the Closure Argument

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):36-49 (2014)
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Contemporary discussions of skepticism often frame the skeptic's argument around an instance of the closure principle. Roughly, the closure principle states that if a subject knows p, and knows that p entails q, then the subject knows q. The main contention of this paper is that the closure argument for skepticism is defective. We explore several possible classifications of the defect. The closure argument might plausibly be classified as begging the question, as exhibiting transmission failure, or as structurally inefficient. Interestingly, perhaps, each of these has been proposed as the correct classification of Moore's proof of an external world.



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Author Profiles

Ian Nance
California State University, Fresno
Philip Atkins
Temple University

Citations of this work

Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism.Guido Tana - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-30.
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Defending the Ignorance View of Sceptical Scenarios.Tim Kraft - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):269-295.

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Meditations on First Philosophy.René Descartes - 1984 [1641] - Ann Arbor: Caravan Books. Edited by Stanley Tweyman.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
The significance of philosophical scepticism.Barry Stroud - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.

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