A Defense of Millian Descriptivism
Dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara (
2013)
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Abstract
Taken together with other plausible theses, Millianism has the counterintuitive consequence that the following belief reports have the same semantic content.
(1a) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies.
(1b) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies.
It has been popular, at least since the publication of Salmon's Frege's Puzzle (1986), to explain the presence of anti-Millian intuitions in terms of pragmatic phenomena. According to Salmon's account, (1a) and (1b) can be used to communicate distinct propositions, and this leads to the mistaken conclusion that (1a) and (1b) differ in semantic content. Since the publication of Soames's Beyond Rigidity (2002) and Thau's Consciousness and Cognition (2002), it has been popular to say that (1a) and (1b) can be used to communicate descriptive propositions. These propositions may be distinct, and this contributes to the mistaken conclusion that (1a) and (1b) differ in semantic content.
In this paper, I elaborate and defend a modified version of Salmon's account. This new account incorporates elements from Soames and Thau, so it can be regarded as a synthesis of previous accounts. It is argued that the new account is superior in various respects, not the least of which is its ability to handle various puzzles and problematic cases. Because of the elements that are incorporated from Soames and Thau, the new account can be regarded as an example of Millian Descriptivism.
After explaining and motivating Salmon's account, I consider several problems. I then propose the modified account as an attractive way of avoiding these problems. It is noted that there are several similarities between the modified account and the accounts offered by Soames and Thau, but it is argued that the new account is superior in maintaining certain elements of Salmon's original account. Several consequences of the new account are discussed. Some of them concern the nature of the a priori and others concern the individuation of beliefs. I conclude by defending the new account against recent attacks on Millian Descriptivism. I argue that the new account is not suspectible to the objections that have been standardly raised against Fregean Descriptivism.