Theoria 81 (4):333-354 (2015)

Authors
Natalie Alana Ashton
University of Stirling
Abstract
According to Duncan Pritchard, there are two kinds of radical sceptical problem; the closure-based problem, and the underdetermination-based problem. He argues that distinguishing these two problems leads to a set of desiderata for an anti-sceptical response, and that the way to meet all of these desiderata is by supplementing a form of Wittgensteinian contextualism with disjunctivist views about factivity. I agree that an adequate response should meet most of the initial desiderata Pritchard puts forward, and that some version of Wittgensteinian contextualism shows the most promise as a starting point for this, but I argue, contra Pritchard, that the addition of disjunctivism is unnecessary and potentially counter-productive. If we draw on lessons from Michael Williams's inferential contextualism then it is both possible, and preferable, to meet the most important of Pritchard's desiderata, undercutting both closure-based and underdetermination-based sceptical problems in a unified way, without the need to resort to disjunctivism
Keywords radical scepticism  BIV  inferential contextualism  underdetermination  closure
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12076
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - New York and London: Harper Torchbooks.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Epistemological Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Rethinking Epistemic Relativism.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):587-607.

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