Free Choice Permission is Strong Permission

Synthese 145 (3):303-323 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Free choice permission, a crucial test case concerning the semantics/ pragmatics boundary, usually receives a pragmatic treatment. But its pragmatic features follow from its semantics. We observe that free choice inferences are defeasible, and defend a semantics of free choice permission as strong permission expressed in terms of a modal conditional in a nonmonotonic logic.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Free choice permission and the counterfactuals of pragmatics.Melissa Fusco - 2014 - Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (4):275-290.
Norm Performatives and Deontic Logic.Rosja Mastop - 2011 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (2):83-105.
Permission from an Input/Output Perspective.David Makinson & Leendert van der Torre - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (4):391 - 416.
Assent and permission rejoinder.Lillian M. Range & C. Randy Cotton - 1995 - Ethics and Behavior 5 (4):345 – 347.
Cartesian memory.Richard Joyce - 1997 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (3):375-393.
Towards a uniform analysis of any.Robert van Rooij - 2008 - Natural Language Semantics 16 (4):297-315.
Conditional obligation and positive permission for agents in time.Mark A. Brown - 2000 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (2):83-111.
Reasoning About Permitted Announcements.P. Balbiani & P. Seban - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (4):445-472.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
139 (#123,604)

6 months
2 (#668,348)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Nicholas Asher
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Daniel Bonevac
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Expressing Permission.William B. Starr - 2016 - Semantics and Linguistic Theory 26:325-349.
Wanting what’s not best.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1275-1296.
The sophisticated kind theory.Matt Teichman - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (9):1613-1654.
On preferring.Kyle Blumberg - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1315-1344.
Compliance and Command II, Imperatives and Deontics.Kit Fine - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):634-664.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Dynamic Logic.Lenore D. Zuck & David Harel - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1480.

View all 19 references / Add more references