Science and Engineering Ethics 21 (2):317-326 (2015)

The enduring innovations in artificial intelligence and robotics offer the promised capacity of computer consciousness, sentience and rationality. The development of these advanced technologies have been considered to merit rights, however these can only be ascribed in the context of commensurate responsibilities and duties. This represents the discernable next-step for evolution in this field. Addressing these needs requires attention to the philosophical perspectives of moral responsibility for artificial intelligence and robotics. A contrast to the moral status of animals may be considered. At a practical level, the attainment of responsibilities by artificial intelligence and robots can benefit from the established responsibilities and duties of human society, as their subsistence exists within this domain. These responsibilities can be further interpreted and crystalized through legal principles, many of which have been conserved from ancient Roman law. The ultimate and unified goal of stipulating these responsibilities resides through the advancement of mankind and the enduring preservation of the core tenets of humanity
Keywords Artificial intelligence  Robot  Responsibility  Rights
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11948-014-9541-0
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,959
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - Philosophy 56 (216):267-268.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Why Robots Should Not Be Treated Like Animals.Deborah G. Johnson & Mario Verdicchio - 2018 - Ethics and Information Technology 20 (4):291-301.
A Fictional Dualism Model of Social Robots.Paula Sweeney - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (3):465-472.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Consciousness, Intentionality, and Intelligence: Some Foundational Issues for Artificial Intelligence.Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere - 2000 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12 (3):263-277.
Artificial Intelligence and Wittgenstein.Gerard Casey - 1988 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 32:156-175.
Robots: Ethical by Design.Gordana Dodig Crnkovic & Baran Çürüklü - 2012 - Ethics and Information Technology 14 (1):61-71.


Added to PP index

Total views
239 ( #46,333 of 2,504,809 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #47,871 of 2,504,809 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes