The roots of conflict and action

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):245 – 267 (1964)
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Abstract

To understand human action in general we must look toward its determinants in the agent's cognitive assessment of an existing situation and in the attitudes this has prompted. But we cannot fully determine why a deed is done without reference also to evaluative appraisal which reveals basic commitment to prescripts. Naturalism either overlooks the autonomy of commitment vis- -vis attitude and cognitive assessment or, erroneously assimilating it to attitude, wholly distorts the plain fact of the clash of duty and inclination. Since the roots of conflict derive from the same source as those of action we respond to it appropriately only if we first identify its components. To ignore commitment distorts conflict as grievously as it does action

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