Science and Engineering Ethics 10 (3):437-455 (2004)
AbstractScience can reinforce the healthy aspects of the politics of the policy process, to identify and further the public interest by discrediting policy options serving only special interests and helping to select among “science-confident” and “hedging” options. To do so, scientists must learn how to manage and communicate the degree of uncertainty in scientific understanding and prediction, lest uncertainty be manipulated to discredit science or to justify inaction. For natural resource and environmental policy, the institutional interests of government agencies, as well as private interests, pose challenges of suppression, over-simplification, or distortion of scientific information. Scientists can combat these maneuvers, but must also look inward to ensure that their own special interests do not undermine the usefulness of science.
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Citations of this work
Climate Change: Evidence of Human Causes and Arguments for Emissions Reduction.Seth D. Baum, Jacob D. Haqq-Misra & Chris Karmosky - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (2):393-410.
References found in this work
Conjectures and Refutations.Karl R. Popper - 1968 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):159-168.