Abstract
Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} In this paper the aim is to reconstruct the rationale of moral autonomy in Hermann Cohen´s ethics. In order to achieve this aim, I consider the complexity of the concept of moral autonomy at its four levels. Mi hypothesis is that Cohen´s argumentation goes from the formal abstraction of the self-legislation to the concrete moment of the selfpreservation. I analyze then Eggert Winter´s critic of Cohen´s concept of moral autonomy, who questions the integration of the levels of the particularity and the universality in this fundamental moment of the theory. Against Winter I argue that Cohen´s process of argumentation succeeds in connecting the different levels of the concept of moral autonomy